AMU Case title

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR FAIZAN MUSTAFA V. NARESH AGARWAL 

Bench

Justices:  

Chief Justice (Dr.) Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Jamshed B. Pardiwala, Justice Dipankar Datta, Justice Manoj Misra, Justice Satish C. Sharma

Questions Raised 

 (i) When does an educational institution qualify as a minority institution entitled to the protections under Article 30 of the Constitution? (ii) Whether the Supreme Court’s judgment in S. Azeez Basha v. Union of India (“Azeez Basha”) (1967 INSC 238), which held that Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) is not a minority institution is correct.

Factual Background:  

Sir Syed Ahmed Khan established the Mohammadan Anglo Oriental College (MAO) on 8 January 1877 in Aligarh. In 1920, the British Imperial Legislative Council enacted the Aligarh Muslim University Act (“AMU Act”), incorporating AMU as a university. In 1950, as part of the Constitution Article 30(1) came into force which grants minorities the right  to establish and administer educational institutions. In 1967, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court (five Judges) in Azeez Basha ruled that AMU was not a minority institution because it was established by statute and thus was not "established" and "administered" by a minority community as required by Article 30(1). 

On 26 November 1981, a Two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Anjuman-e-Rahmaniya v. District Inspector of Schools (“Rahmaniya”) (W.P.(C) No. 54-57 of 1981 ) referred the correctness of  Azeez Basha to a Seven-Judge Bench. Parliament then enacted the Aligarh Muslim University (Amendment) Act, 1981 (“1981 Amendment”). This Amendment amended the AMU Act significantly and defined the “University” as an institution “established by the Muslims of India,” originating as MAO College and later incorporated as AMU, aiming to further the educational and cultural advancement of Indian Muslims.

In 2005, the Allahabad High Court declared AMU’s fifty-percent reservation policy for Muslim students in its postgraduate medical program unconstitutional. In doing so, the High Court held that AMU was not a minority institution under Article 30(1) even after the 1981 Amendment. On 12 February 2019, a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court, led by the Chief Justice Ranjan Gogoi, heard AMU’s appeal and observed that the High Court’s decision relied on Azeez Basha, the correctness of which had been questioned in Rahmaniya and not yet conclusively decided. Consequently, the Court referred the matter to a Seven-Judge Bench.

Decision of the Supreme Court:  

The Supreme Court by a 4-3  majority overruled Azeez Basha. The majority held that merely because an institute is created by a statute does not strip it of minority status. The majority also held that Article 30(1) protects institutes established before the Constitution came into force in 1950. The Court laid down criteria to determine when an institution is a minority institution benefitting from Article 30(1) protection. The majority judgment was authored by Chief Justice Chandrachud. Justices  Kant, Datta and Sharma authored separate (partly dissenting) opinions. 

Reasons for the Decision:  

The reference in Rahmaniya is not bad in law

The majority upheld the decision of the Two-Judge Bench in Rahmaniya which questioned the correctness of Azeez Basha and requested that the matter be placed before the Chief Justice for consideration by a Seven-Judge Bench. The majority further clarified that the Chief Justice retains discretionary administrative authority to assign cases to any Bench of any strength irrespective of whether they are part of the bench referring the issue to a larger bench (¶¶36–39 CJ. Chandrachud).

Justices Kant, Datta, and Sharma in their dissenting opinions held that the manner of referral to a larger bench in Rahmaniya was legally flawed and breached established norms of judicial propriety (¶91 J. Kant, ¶¶24-25 J. Datta, ¶266 J. Sharma). Justice Kant noted that the Division Bench (two judges) in Rahmaniya, being of lesser strength than the Constitution Bench (five judges) in Azeez Basha, lacked the authority to explicitly question the correctness of  Azeez Basha or suggest the strength of the bench which should resolve the alleged conflict (¶¶93-94 J. Kant). He held that a direction specifying the strength of the bench to which a case should be referred to impaired the Chief Justice of India’s authority as the master of the roster (¶94 J. Kant). 

Justice Datta observed that the issue should have first been placed before a Three-Judge Bench (¶28 J. Datta). He further  held that Rahmaniya was concerned with the registration of a minority institution under the Societies Registration Act, while Azeez Basha addressed the incorporation of a university by statute. Thus, referring Azeez Basha to a seven-judge bench was unwarranted, even on merits (¶42 J. Datta).

Minority status is not lost merely because an institute is created by a statute

The majority held that the right to establish and administer educational institutions under Article 30(1) extends to institutions established both before and after the Constitution’s adoption (¶¶81–83 CJ. Chandrachud, ¶¶67 J. Datta, ¶¶107-108 J. Kant). 

The majority held that an educational institution does not lose its minority status merely because it is created by a statute (¶98 CJ. Chandrachud, ¶¶151-155,190 J.Kant). The majority clarified the distinction between "incorporation" and "establishment," noting that incorporation gives legal existence to an institution, while establishment refers to its founding. The majority emphasised that the status of a minority institution depends on the individuals or group behind its creation, not the legal process through which it was incorporated (¶¶93-94 CJ. Chandrachud). The majority stressed that the examination of its founding should be based on the situation at the time of the Constitution’s adoption, not before independence (¶¶112, 122 CJ. Chandrachud).

Justice Kant in his separate opinion also held that if an institution possesses legal existence independent of the statute, then the statute merely recognises an existing institution and does not establish it and therefore it cannot take away the role of the minority community in bringing the institution into existence (¶155 J. Kant). However, the legislative intent behind the establishment of an institution plays a significant role in determining the character of that institution (¶190 J. Kant, ¶ 266 J. Sharma). 

Azeez Basha does not lay down the correct law

The majority held that Azeez Basha incorrectly relied on The Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (“Dargah Committee”) (1961 INSC 101) to support the view that a minority’s right to administer an institution could be forfeited under certain circumstances. It found that Durgah Committee was concerned with the the right of religious denominations to own and administer property under Article 26. The majority ruled that no parallel could be drawn between the rights under Article 26 and Article 30(1), as the scope and nature of the rights under these provisions are different (¶¶73, 78, 79 CJ. Chandrachud).

Justice Kant in his separate dissenting opinion held that Azeez Basha needed to be clarified because it holds that before 1956, university degrees did not need to be recognised by the government, while also holding that it was only the AMU Act which allowed AMU to confer degrees. This led it to conclude that AMU was brought into existence by an act of legislation (¶190 J.Kant).

Justice Sharma in his separate dissenting opinion held that Azeez Basha does not categorically prohibit minorities from establishing universities through statutes because the case dealt with a unique situation where a university established by the British Legislative Council had claimed minority status (¶¶188-190 J. Sharma). 

Criteria for the ‘establishment’ of a minority educational institution

The majority held that an institution’s minority status does not require it to exclusively serve the minority community. It must predominantly benefit the minority, and courts must examine the origin of the institution, such as who sought its establishment, the purpose for which it was founded, and the steps taken to implement its creation. This includes factors like funding, land acquisition, and construction, all of which should primarily involve the minority community (¶¶134-136 CJ. Chandrachud). 

The majority held that it is not necessary to prove that the administration of the university vests with the minority community to prove that it is a minority educational institution. This is because the very purpose of Article 30(1) is to grant special additional rights regarding administration as a consequence of establishment. The majority ruled that while it is not necessary for minority members to manage the institution, the administration should still affirm the institution's minority purpose (¶¶138-139 CJ. Chandrachud). It also ruled that the status of an institution as one of national importance does not negate its minority character, as the terms "national" and "minority" are not mutually exclusive (¶148 CJ. Chandrachud).

Justices Kant, Datta, and Sharma agreed with the criteria set out by  the majority but made certain additional observations.  According to Justices Kant and Sharma, legal and factual control over the university’s administration must vest with the minority community to benefit from the protections under Article 30 (¶¶184-186 J. Kant, ¶¶167-169 J. Sharma). Justice Sharma also observed that the minority community must prove that the institution was brought about due to the efforts of the minority community (¶169 J. Sharma). Justice Datta cautioned that a rigid, one-size-fits-all framework would be unsuitable for accurately assessing minority institution status (¶¶54, 57 J. Datta). 

AMU’s minority status is to be decided by another bench

The majority held that the core issue in Rahmaniya was regarding the essential ingredients of a minority education institution. The 2019 reference order was also limited to the criteria to qualify as a minority educational institution (¶¶33-35 CJ. Chandrachud). Thus, having laid out these criteria the majority, along with Justices Kant and Sharma, held that the issue of whether AMU was a minority institution should be decided by a regular bench (¶¶35,161 CJ. Chandrachud, ¶188 J.Kant, ¶¶ 126, 218 J.Sharma).

However, Justice Datta in his dissenting opinion, held that sending AMU's minority status to a regular bench was unnecessary, as the issue had been extensively argued, and resolving it would save judicial time (¶50 J.Datta). Despite finding the reference legally invalid, he chose to answer the reference and affirmed the conclusion in Azeez Basha that AMU was established by the imperial legislature through the AMU Act, not by the Muslim community (¶¶87-88 J. Datta). 

Justice Datta observed that the societies linked to AMU’s claimed minority heritage dissolved with the enactment of the AMU Act (¶77 J. Datta). He further ruled that the governance structure, funding, admissions, and appointments in the University demonstrates an involvement of the State which amounted to absolute control over the administration of the University (¶101 J. Datta). He emphasised that the AMU Act’s preamble lacked any recognition of minority contributions (¶72 J. Datta).